Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 4 | Issue 2

Article 5

2009

Eliminating the Secondary Earner Bias: Lessons
from Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland
Tonya Major Gauff

Recommended Citation
Tonya Major Gauff, Eliminating the Secondary Earner Bias: Lessons from Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc.
Pol'y. 424 (2009).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol4/iss2/5

This Note or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Copyright 2009 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy

Volume 4 (Fall 2009)

Eliminating the Secondary Earner Bias:
Lessons from Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland
Tonya Major Gauff∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Many working married women are unfairly burdened by the implicit gender bias in
the United States Internal Revenue Code (IRC). According to Professor Edward
McCaffery, the best financial advice for women today is “Don’t marry. Don’t have kids.
Don’t work.”1 How married women are taxed undoubtedly affects their decisions to
work after getting married, to have children, and to continue working after having
children. Married women face these questions primarily because of the secondary earner
bias—a bias that emerges in the tax rules that govern married couples. Due to this bias,
some married working women, as secondary earners,2 are subject to high marginal
income taxes because of the way their income is treated when filing jointly with their
husbands. In fact, the average working married woman loses over two-thirds of her pay
to income taxes.3
However, many other countries around the world do not tax secondary earners at
such surprisingly high rates. For example, in the last two decades, Malaysia, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland have implemented extensive tax reforms concerning the treatment
of working married women. This Comment undertakes an international and comparative
analysis of how these foreign tax systems treat working married women. Through
analyzing these tax reforms and highlighting their most progressive measures, this
Comment shows that the secondary earner bias within the U.S. tax code produces a
discriminatory effect in need of correction.
In Part II, this Comment commences with an examination of the history and
implementation of the married filing jointly designation in the United States that led to
∗

Juris Doctor, 2009, Northwestern University School of Law; MPA University of Texas at Austin; B.A.
Dillard University. I especially would like to thank Professor Stephanie Hoffer for her endless assistance
with this Comment, Professor Nancy Staudt for her time, instruction, and patience, and the editorial staff
members of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their superb editing.
1
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN: HOW THE MARRIAGE PENALTY AFFECTS YOUR TAXES 29–57
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1997) (1999) (McCaffery offers this advice in a joking manner but with the intent
of showing how women are greatly affected by the tax code); see also Kim Tso, Work, Motherhood and
Taxes, MOTHERSANDMORE.ORG, Mar./Apr. 2004, http://www.mothersandmore.org/Forum/TsoTaxingMothersFORUM.pdf.
2
Women are customarily deemed secondary earners because they earn less than their husbands.
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21. Additionally, often the lower earner is the least committed to the
workforce (e.g., because of leaving the workforce to have children) and thus can be viewed as the
secondary earner. See generally Kristin Maschka, Tax Law Pushes ‘Secondary Earners’ to Drop Out,
WOMEN’S ENEWS, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2703.
3
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21.
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the creation of the secondary earner bias. It includes an analysis of the common instances
of this bias in the IRC and the insufficiency of prior amendments by Congress to
eliminate its effects on married couples. This Comment shows that the legislative
attempts to alleviate this secondary earner bias have not been sufficient, and hence, we
should look outside the United States for solutions, specifically to Malaysia, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland. Part III surveys the history of the treatment of working married
women in the tax systems of Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland and then
considers the tax reforms responsible for the more favorable treatment that working
married women receive in these countries. In Part IV, this Comment proposes that the
United States incorporate the tax reforms of Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland
into the IRC. This proposal includes a separate assessment filing designation for married
couples whereby married women have the option of filing separately from their husbands
and being taxed according to the IRC’s joint filing tax rates with applicable transferable
credits between the spouses.
II. HISTORY OF THE TAXATION OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
¶4

The IRC currently offers five different filing options:4 single, married filing jointly,
married filing separately, head of household, and qualifying widower with a dependent
child.5 While the specific tax rates associated with each filing status differ, all are
progressive; in other words, a taxpayer’s marginal rate increases with her income.6 Aside
4

See I.R.C. § 1 (2008).
Included is a table briefly explaining the different filing status options. For further explanation, see I.R.S.,
EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION, I.R.S. Pub. No. 501, at 6 (Dec. 11, 2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf.

5

Filing Status
Single
Married Filing Jointly
Married Filing Separately
Head of Household

Qualifying Widower with dependent child

Qualifications
On the last day of the tax year, taxpayer is not
married or legally separated from spouse and do
not qualify for another filing status.
On the last day of the tax year, couple is legally
married and chooses to file jointly.
Couple is legally married and chooses to file
separately.
Taxpayer is not married and paid for cost of
maintaining a home for himself and a
relative/dependent, who lived with him for over
half of the year.
Surviving spouse of deceased spouse that died
within the last two taxable years and surviving
spouse maintained the principal home for
qualifying dependents and has not remarried.

6

The table below portrays the 2009 progressive tax rate schedules for each filing status. Note that married
filing jointly and qualifying widower with dependent child share the same schedule. See I.R.C. §1(d),
amendment in Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, tbls.1–5 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2008-45_IRB/ar14.html.
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from a few minor exceptions, married couples must choose either to file jointly or
separately.7 Due to a series of special rules associated with tax credits and exemptions,
married couples who file jointly are likely to incur a lower tax burden than similarly
situated couples filing two separate returns under the “married filing separately” option.8
For this reason, 96& of married couples file one joint return.9 Accordingly, to understand
Filing Status
Single

Married Filing Jointly or Qualifying Widower
with dependent child

Married Filing Separately

Head of Household

7

Tax Rate Schedule
10% on the income between $0 and $8350
15% on the income between $8350 and $33,950;
plus $835
25% on the income between $33,950 and $82,250;
plus $4,675
28% on the income between $82,250 and
$171,550; plus $16,750
33% on the income between $171,550 and
$372,950; plus $41,754
35% on the income over $372,950; plus $108,216
10% on the income between $0 and $16,700
15% on the income between $16,700 and $67,900;
plus $1,670
25% on the income between $67,900 and
$137,050; plus $9,350
28% on the income between $137,050 and
$208,850; plus $26,637.50
33% on the income between $208,850 and
$372,950; plus $46,741.50
35% on the income over $372,950; plus
$100,894.50
10% on the income between $0 and $8350
15% on the income between $8350 and $33,950;
plus $835
25% on the income between $33,950 and $68,525;
plus $4,675
28% on the income between $68,525 and
$104,425; plus $13,318.75
33% on the income between $104,425 and
$186,475; plus $23,370.75
35% on the income over $186,475; plus
$50,447.25
10% on the income between $0 and $11,950
15% on the income between $11,950 and $45,500;
plus $1,195
25% on the income between $45,500 and
$117,450; plus $6,227.50
28% on the income between $117,450 and
$190,200; plus $24,215
33% on the income between $190,200 and
$372,950; plus $44,585
35% on the income over $372,950; plus
$104,892.50

I.R.S. Pub. No. 501, supra note 5, at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
9
I.R.S., SOURCES OF INCOME TAX STATISTICS - INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304,
at tbl.1.2 (All Returns: Adjusted Gross Income, Exemptions, Deductions, and Tax Items), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134951,00.html. See also infra notes 72–74.
8
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the effects of the current tax rules on married women, this Comment focuses primarily on
those who select the “married filing jointly” option and only briefly notes the tax
consequences of couples who choose to file separately.
Before examining the discriminatory effects on the secondary earner under joint
filing, it is crucial to first analyze the legislative history of the married filing jointly
designation in order to understand where the discriminatory effects on working married
women as secondary earners originate. Discussion of the legislative history will show
that Congress influenced married couples to file jointly to appease both the economic
conditions and social norms of the time.
A. From Independent to Joint Filing

¶6

¶7

¶8

The federal government obtained the power to impose an income tax with the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.10 Initially, regardless of marital status,
all taxpayers were taxed as individuals. In the words of Boris Bittker, “[t]ax legislation
enacted by Congress was dominated by an individualistic approach at the outset.”11
Between 1913 and 1948, an identical tax rate schedule governed both married and single
individuals.12 Following the social norms at the time, most husbands worked while their
wives remained in the home.13 As such, the husband’s income was customarily the only
income.
Because of individualized taxation, married couples, primarily wealthy ones,14
explored avenues to reduce their tax liability. One popular method was income
splitting,15 or the dividing of income between each spouse. To understand why this
approach was economically rational, reconsider the progressive tax rates. Unlike a
system of flat taxes, which imposes a single rate on every dollar earned, a progressive tax
system imposes a higher marginal tax rate on higher levels of income. This means that
the first dollars of income are subject to the lowest rates, but as income goes up, so do the
rates. In the 1930s, for example, Congress imposed a 0% rate on income between $0 and
$20,000, but a 40% rate on income over $70,000.16 Couples desired to shift income
between one another to avail themselves of the tax code’s lower rates and thereby
decrease their overall tax burden.
These tax avoidance schemes were, of course, challenged in federal court. In 1930,
the Supreme Court decided two landmark cases addressing the issue. In Lucas v. Earl,17
the Court held that a husband could not shift his earned income to his wife in a common

10

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1400 (1975).
12
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 16, 30–32. See also Bittker, supra note 11.
13
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 31, 33 (“In 1939, somewhere between 80% and 90% of all income taxes
were paid by men or male-dominated households” and “[a]s late as 1940, only 12–15% of wives appeared
to be working outside of the home at all, and less than 10% of married mothers worked . . . . A 1936 Gallup
poll revealed that 82% of all respondents and even 75% of the females polled, thought that a woman with
an employed husband should not work outside the home.”).
14
Id. at 47–48 (“Income splitting was still largely a rich family’s issue in the 1940’s, even after the
expansion of the income tax during World War II.”).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 31 tbl.5.
17
281 U.S. 111, 113–15 (1930).
11
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law separate property jurisdiction.18 The Court, however, modified the scope of this rule
in Poe v. Seaborn,19 which held that in a community property state,20 shifting was
justified given that half the husband’s earned income belonged to the wife under state
law.21 However, according to McCaffery, the Supreme Court allowed income splitting
in community property states, not under the notion of equality for married women, but
rather to validate the authority of the husband.22 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court,
stated, “[public] policy dictates that third parties who deal with the husband respecting
community property shall be assured that the wife shall not be permitted to nullify his
transactions.”23
¶9
After Poe, while many states retained their preexisting laws,24 a number of
common law states enacted statutes allowing couples to shift income and marital
property, influencing “husbands in separate property states [to] attempt self-help income
splitting, through both gifts of property and by making their wives business partners.”25
This led to asymmetrical tax treatment of economically identical couples across the
nation and confusion in the courts.26 Accordingly, Congress reacted.27
¶10
In 1948, Congress created joint filing for married couples.28 Instead of the
individual filing system, married couples could now file joint returns and be treated as a
18

In a separate property state, income and property acquired by each spouse during the marriage is treated
as separately owned by each spouse. See Bittker, supra note 11, at 1400.
19
282 U.S. 101, 101–16 (1930). Note that in this case the IRS’s argument was that regardless of the type
of state the couple resided in, community property or separate property, and regardless if the wife acquired
the property on her own, the husband controlled the property. Thus, the husband cannot shift his income or
property to his wife. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 40–42.
20
In a community property state, each spouse is entitled to half of the other spouse’s income and property
acquired during the marriage. Bittker provides a detailed analysis of the differences between a community
property state and a common law separate jurisdiction state. Bittker also discusses how married women
were treated in each state during this time. See Bittker, supra note 11, at 1400.
21
Poe, 282 U.S. at 101–16. The Supreme Court applied the rationale that a husband could not shift income
or property to his wife to decrease his tax liability in a separate property state in Hoeper v. Tax
Commission. 284 U.S. 206, 215 (1931) (“[A]ny attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's
property or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
22
See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 41–42.
23
Poe, 282 U.S. at 112.
24
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 345 (1994).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Revenue Act of 1948, I.R.S. Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948). The IRS proposed that Congress
enact mandatory joint filing in 1941, but the proposal was defeated. See Bittker, supra note 11, at 1408–10.
For additional resources concerning the political debate surrounding the creation of the married filing
jointly designation, specifically the heightened period of debate between 1913 and 1948, see, for example,
Revenue Revision, 1934: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd Cong. 111 (1933);
Revenue Revision, 1947: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways & Means on Revenue Revisions, 80th
Cong. 890 (1947); ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 44–72 (1943) (this book was
written as the secondary earner provision was being debated and argued for an equity provision for the
wife); Alice Kessler-Harris, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy: Symposium: A Historical
Outlook: “A Principle of Law But Not of Justice: Men, Women and Income Taxes in the United States,” 6
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 331, 343–60 (Spring 1997); Godfrey Nelson, Problems Posed by Joint
Returns, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1941, at 5; Roscoe Pound, Pound Scores Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1941,
at 12; Women Plan to Fight Joint Tax Return: Miss Kenyon, Miss Donlan Direct Drive, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
1942, at 16 (noting that women’s coalitions that opposed joint tax returns at the time included the National
Negro Business and Professional Women’s Club, General Federal of Women’s Club, and National
Association of Women Lawyers).
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single economic unit for tax purposes. Initially, the IRC treated the income of the couple
as split, allocated equally between the two spouses.29 Congress stated that the married
filing jointly designation was created to answer the income splitting confusion that was
occurring in various states and to reduce taxes for married couples:
Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial
geographical equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes.
The impetuous enactment of community-property legislation by States that
have long used the common law will be forestalled. The incentive for
married couples in common-law States to attempt the reduction of their
taxes by the division of their income through such devices as trusts, joint
tenancies, and family partnerships will be reduced materially.
Administrative difficulties stemming from the use of such devices will be
diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous legislation on the
income-tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships.30
Congress assumed that the new joint filing rules would reduce the tax burden on families
because, ultimately, only the husband would be taxed.31 As previously mentioned,
“income from a high income, high marginal rate husband, [could be shifted] to a low
income, low marginal rate wife (until enough income had been shifted to put both
spouses in the same tax bracket).”32 Thus, even if the wife did work, if her income was
less than her husband’s income, the couple could still benefit from joint filing.
¶11
Nevertheless, Congress’ purported reasons for creating the married filing jointly
option do not cohere with the evidence available at the time. Research conducted for
discussion of the legislation in the congressional record stated that by 1947 “only about
one in ten families would benefit from joint filing; statements before the Ways and
Means Committee put the figure at 5%.”33 Most married couples at the time were not
sufficiently wealthy to benefit from income splitting, because most married couples
earned less than $40,000.34 Congress actually was enacting policy that primarily favored
wealthy, married men. The legal and social norms at the time placed married women at a
subordinate level to their husbands. Justice Roberts’ reasoning in Poe35 and the fact that
99% of the members of Congress in 1948 were men36 indicate that married women—
even women in general—were not well situated to create or influence the preparation of
new laws.37 Although no congressman or senator explicitly stated this at the time, “the
common pattern . . . is for Congress not to mention less noble reasons for change.”38
29

MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 54.
S. REP. NO. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1948).
31
Maschka, supra note 2.
32
Zelenak, supra note 24, at 344–45. As a result, control was often bestowed upon the economically
dominant spouse in the relationship, which in many cases was the husband. Id.
33
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 48–49.
34
Id. at 47–49. In 1948, couples earning less than $40,000 were taxed in the lowest income tax bracket.
35
282 U.S. 101, 112 (1930).
36
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 57.
37
Not all members of Congress disregarded married women’s contributions to their family. In response to
New York Representative Frank Crowther’s statement that it was inequitable for the husband to income
split with his wife when he solely earned the income, Texas Senator Tom Connally argued “[t]hat is not
true. I don’t care whether the Treasurer says it or who said it, it is not true, and as to that under our law it is
30
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¶12

Another crucial factor behind the creation of the married filing jointly designation
was to maintain the wife’s place as a homemaker and not necessarily a worker. After
World War II, Congress wanted women to relinquish their jobs so those jobs could be
filled by soldiers returning home.39 In fact, the author of the joint filing plan, Stanley
Surrey, wrote in 1948 that “wives need not continue to master the details of the retail
drug business, electrical equipment business, or construction business, but may return
from their partnership ‘duties’ to the pursuit of homemaking.”40 McCaffery notes that
“[t]here was much hope, or rather much assuming, that the end of the war would mean a
return to normalcy in another sense: married women, especially mothers, would leave the
workforce they had entered during the war as part of the wartime production effort, and
go back home.”41 Once again, Congress’ rationale was that only the husband’s income
would be taxed because the wife would remain in or return to the home. The husband
could then reduce the couple’s taxes by shifting income to the lower tax bracket of his
non-working wife.
¶13
The ultimate consequence, though, of the implementation of the married filing
jointly designation was the creation of the secondary earner bias.
B. Married Women and the Secondary Earner Bias
¶14

“[N]o one saw the secondary-earner bias because there were so few secondary
earners [in 1948] . . . no one paid any significant attention to working wives.”42 The joint
filing rules emerged in 1948 at a time when most married women worked at home; since
that time, however, an increasing number of married women have moved into the labor
force, and for this reason, they are subject to a possible secondary earner bias.43 To
understand the secondary earner bias, it is important to understand both the nature of the
law and the reality of married women’s market choices. First, recall that the law treats
married couples as a single economic unit and imposes progressive tax rates on both

not all earned by the husband; it is joint earnings of the wife who stays at home, raises the children and
helps economize in the kitchen; she is contributing just as much to the success of the husband as the
husband is. It is not true that the husband earns it all and I am sure Dr. Crowther will not go home tonight
and contend that to Mrs. Crowther.” Revenue Revision, 1934: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 73rd Cong. 111 (1933).
38
Zelenak, supra note 24, at 346.
39
Tso, supra note 1. Congress had statistics indicating that women were leaving the workforce as the war
was coming to an end and soldiers were returning home. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 51 (“The
participation rate for women in the labor force [during the war] rose from 27.9% in 1940 to 35.8% in 1945,
but then dipped back down to 31.5% by 1947; the numbers for married women alone were far lower, and
for married mothers lower still.”).
40
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 57.
41
Id. at 51.
42
Id. at 58.
43
Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional
Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 948 (1986) (“Girls are socialized to
serve others, to be interested in women’s jobs, to be primarily responsible for child care, and to regard their
roles as wage earners as secondary to their other material responsibilities.”); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and
Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 474 (1990) (“The [unemployment] system
historically excluded women because of their different pattern of labor force participation and because it
viewed women’s income as secondary.”); Stephanie Hoffer, Adopting the Family Taxable Unit, 76 U. CIN.
L. REV. 55, 88 (2007) (“Secondary earner bias is a characteristic that the family taxable unit unfortunately
shares with joint filing . . . .”).
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individuals’ combined income. The law effectively requires “stacking”44 one spouse’s
income atop the other for purposes of determining the total tax burden.45
¶15
The income of the spouse that is stacked at the higher level is taxed at higher tax
46
rates. Due to the benefit of income splitting under a progressive tax rate schedule, a
couple’s tax liability can potentially be decreased through shifting income from the
higher earning spouse to the lower income spouse’s tax bracket. For a couple to fully
realize the benefit of income splitting, the IRC makes it more favorable for the higher
income to be placed at the bottom and the lower income to be stacked at the top. In other
words, couples implicitly decide which spouse’s income is primary and which spouse’s
income is secondary for tax purposes. By placing the higher income in the lower level,
the higher income can be shifted to the lower tax brackets and thus decrease income
taxes.
¶16
The higher income possibly loses the benefit of the income shift with the addition
of the lower income. Once the shifted income exhausts the lower tax bracket limit, a
couple is moved to the next higher tax bracket and higher taxes are due. On top of that,
because of the income shift of the higher income to the lower tax brackets and the fact
that the lower income is stacked above the higher income, the lower income amount is
initially taxed in the next higher income tax bracket. Under the current law, a married
man is guaranteed to incur a tax rate of 10% on the first dollar earned, but married
women (if they indeed are secondary earners) must face a rate of 25, 28, 33, or 35%.47
These rules have notable effects for married women at all income levels. “[S]econdary
earners among the poor can face tax rates well in excess of 50%, sometimes even
exceeding 100%,”48 while middle- and upper-income married couples lose an average of
78% of the secondary earner’s income.49
¶17
This leaves couples in the position of having to decide which spouse’s earnings are
primary and secondary50 and whether the secondary earner’s income is benefiting or
penalizing the family financially. If women cannot get paid an amount sufficient to cover
the costs associated with market labor (such as clothing, commuting, and child care
costs), then they will be less likely to work outside the home.51 Importantly, it is
women’s after-tax salary that must be considered.52
44

Tso, supra note 1.
Id.
46
Id.
47
For tax rates for married filing jointly, see infra note 59. See also Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and
Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (1999) (“Single
workers and married men face a marginal tax rate schedule that starts at zero and rises gradually as
earnings rise, but wives, as secondary earners, face a marginal tax rate schedule that begins in the tax rate
determined by their husband’s earnings.”). As a result, the wife, as the secondary earner, cannot take
advantage of having her income taxed at zero tax or lower tax rates because her husband has already done
so.
48
Tso, supra note 1 (citing MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21). What McCaffery is supposing is possible
because of the loss of various welfare and social benefits for the poor.
49
Id. at 21.
50
Lora Cicconi, Comment, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An Examination of
Gender-based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 257, 267
(2006–2007) (“Since joint filing pools two incomes and then applies the appropriate exemptions and tax
rates to calculate a couple’s tax liability number, it encourages couples to think in terms of a primary earner
and a secondary earner.”).
51
See infra note 65.
52
See Maschka, supra note 2.
45
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In most marriages, secondary earners are women, not men.53 This is because, for
one, wives on average earn less than their husbands.54 Second, many married women
have children and decide to leave the workforce, temporarily or altogether, to become the
primary caregivers in the home. Because husbands are frequently able to continue
working despite changes in family size, they are often solidified as the primary earners
and their wives as the secondary earners.55 This nomenclature is in no way intended to
be derogatory, but rather descriptive of modern family dynamics.56 Thus, as married
women enter the workplace initially or return after an absence, it is they who usually face
the tax penalties associated with secondary earner status.57
1. Illustrating the Secondary Earner Bias with Three Hypothetical Taxpayers

¶19

This section examines three hypothetical married couples with different levels of
income in order to illustrate when and how the secondary earner bias surfaces.58 The first
example involves a married couple in which only the husband works in the paid labor
force; the second example involves a married couple in which both spouses earn the same
level of market income; and the third involves a married couple in which both spouses
earn income, but the husband earns more than his wife. In all three scenarios, because
each couple ultimately pays the same amount of taxes, the focus can be on the economic
disadvantages to the secondary earner in the family, if one spouse is so classified.
¶20
Example One: Consider a married couple in which only the husband works, earning
an annual income of $80,000. Under the current code provisions, the couple will owe
income taxes of $12,375.59 Utilizing a progressive tax rate schedule, the IRC breaks
down the $80,000 into tax brackets or levels based on the amount of income earned. The
couple is paying 10% on the first $16,700 of income, 15% on $51,200 of the next level of
income, and 25% on $12,100 of the last level of income.60 The average effective tax
53

MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21. See also Michael Bar & Oksana Leukhina, To Work or Not to Work:
Did Tax Reforms Affect Labor Force Participation of Married Couples?, 9 B.E. J. OF MACROECONOMICS
(2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol9/iss1/art28/ (noting that between 1960 and 2000, the
number of two earner families in the United States increased from 34% to 77%. In 1959 and 1999, 95%
and 79%, respectively, of secondary earners were married women).
54
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 21.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Alstott, supra note 47, at 2009.
58
These examples exclude applicable deductions, exemptions, and credits to simplify the focus on how the
secondary earner bias arises.
59
Income tax is calculated using IRC 2009 schedule for married filing jointly under I.R.C. §1(a)(2),
amendment in Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, tbl.1 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2008-45_IRB/ar14.html.
If the taxable income is:
Not over $16,700
Over $16,700 but not over $67,900
Over $67,900 but not over $137,050
Over $137,050 but not over $208,850
Over $208,850 but not over $372,950
Over $372,950
60

Id.
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The tax is:
10% of taxable income
$1670, plus 15% of the excess over $16,700
$9350, plus 25% of the excess over $67,900
$26,637.50, plus 28% of the excess over $137,050
$46,741.50, plus 33% of the excess over $208,850
$100,894.50, plus 35% of the excess over $372,950
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rate is 15%.61 If the wife decides to enter into the workforce, her income will be stacked
on top of her husband’s income, and thus her very first dollar will be subject to a 25% tax
rate—the highest marginal rate imposed on her husband.62 This means that the wife’s
average effective tax rate will be at least 10% more than her husband’s rate.63
¶21
Example Two: Now consider a married couple in which both spouses work and
earn the same salary of $40,000, for a total of $80,000. Their income tax due is $12,375,
with an average effective tax rate of 15%. In this context, we cannot be sure whether the
married woman is the secondary earner or not. If she decides to leave the workforce but
later re-enter at a salary lower than her husband’s, then she will suffer the same economic
consequences discussed in Example One. But if both remain in the workforce, the
portion of income taxed in the higher 25% bracket comes from neither spouse’s income
disproportionately; in this scenario, there is no clear secondary earner in the family and
equal tax treatment of both spouses’ incomes.
¶22
Example Three: Finally, consider a married couple in which both spouses work but
the husband earns more than the wife. The husband earns $60,000 and the wife earns
$20,000, totaling $80,000. Their income tax, like those of the couples discussed above, is
$12,375, with an average effective tax rate of 15%. Assume the wife is the secondary
earner, and thus her income is stacked on top of the husband’s income. The IRC
allocates taxes against the $60,000 of income first and then the $20,000 of income. The
couple realizes a benefit, because they are able to shift a portion of the higher income to
lower tax brackets. However, this benefit becomes limited with the addition of the wife’s
$20,000 of income. Her income is taxed at the highest marginal tax rate of her
husband’s—25%. The wife is mistaken if she thinks she is bringing in net income of
$17,000, which is her $20,000 income applied to the average effective tax rate of 15%.
The wife is actually netting only $15,000, which is her $20,000 applied to the marginal
tax rate of 25%.64
¶23
With these three examples, it should now be obvious that the tax laws provide a
distinct disincentive for many married women to work in the paid labor force. Consider
again the wife in the couple from Example One above and assume she decides to re-enter
the workforce after having children. After paying income taxes, social security taxes,
state and local taxes, childcare expenses, transportation expenses to and from work,
among other expenses, it is possible that the wife, and the family as a whole, will not
acquire any financial gain from her returning to work.65 Indeed, once a married woman
61

The effective tax rate is the average rate at which a person is taxed on his taxable or earned income. The
effective tax rate is calculated by dividing the total tax due by total amount of taxable income. Thus, the
effective tax rate in this example equals $12,376 divided by $80,000.
62
See Tso, supra note 1.
63
In this context, the effective tax rate is the average rate at which a person is taxed on his taxable or
earned income. Please note that if the wife earned more than her husband, her income would have been
considered first.
64
Note that if the wife earned more than her husband, her income would have been considered first and the
husband would suffer the secondary earner bias. McCaffery provides further numerical examples of how
married women as secondary earners are penalized. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 84.
65
See Tso, supra note 1; see also Maschka, supra note 2. Maschka uses her and her husband’s income as
an example. If her husband pays an estimated 8% federal income tax and a 10% state and local tax, her
husband would make $0.68 for every dollar earned on his $59,400 salary, under an effective tax rate of
14%. If Maschka decides to work and earns $20,000, she would have to add the social security and state
and local income taxes plus estimated childcare expenses of $6000. As a result, she would only make
$0.27 on the dollar, under an effective tax rate of 25%. This calculation does not include the additional
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leaves the workforce, she is less likely to re-enter it given the high marginal taxes.66 This
structure leads women who do decide to re-enter the workforce to seek to counteract the
high marginal taxes by undertaking a variety of strategies, such as changing the way in
which they are compensated (e.g., paid cash wages or non-taxable fringe benefits).67
Primary earners in the family do not face the same high marginal tax rates on the first
dollar earned and thus need not take such action.
2. Married Filing Separately Designation is an Option but not Economically Feasible
¶24

A complete discussion of how the tax laws affect married women includes mention
of the fact that married couples need not file jointly and thus be subject to the analyses set
forth above. They also have the option of filing separately. Today, however, individual
filing is different from the discrete individual approach adhered to under the IRC between
1913 and 1948.68 Currently, under the married filing separately designation, each
spouse’s individual income will be taxed according to a designated progressive tax
schedule different from the schedule for married filing jointly taxpayers.69 There are
limited advantages in filing separately.70 For example, if one spouse owes a significant
amount of income taxes and the other does not or if one spouse sold his home and wants
to qualify for profit exclusion, separate filing might be rational.71
¶25
In general, however, a couple’s taxes are likely to be quite a bit higher if they file
separately than if they file jointly.72 For instance, a married couple earning $80,000 and

expenses she might have to pay (e.g., expenses for clothes and meals). Because of the tax burden, Maschka
and her husband decided that she would not work and remain at home.
66
JOINT ECON. COMM., REPORT ON REDUCING MARRIAGE TAXES: ISSUES AND PROPOSALS: A JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE STUDY 5 (Comm. Print May 1998) (“High marginal taxes may not induce women
to leave the workforce to the same extent that low marginal tax rates encourage them to enter.”).
67
Id.
68
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 15–16.
69
The following is the IRC 2009 schedule for married filing separately under I.R.C. §1(d), amendment in
Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, tbl.4 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/200845_IRB/ar14.html.
If the taxable income is:
Not over $8350
Over $8350 but not over $33,950
Over $33,950 but not over $68,525
Over $68,525 but not over $104,425
Over $104,425 but not over $186,475
Over $186,475

The tax is:
10% of taxable income
$835, plus 15% of the excess over $8350
$4675, plus 25% of the excess over $33,950
$13,318.75, plus 28% of the excess over $68,525
$23,370.75, plus 33% of the excess over $104,425
$50,447.25, plus 35% of the excess over $186,475

See supra note 59 for the married filing jointly schedule.
70
See Sandra Block, ‘Til Taxes Do You Part: When Married Couples Should File Separately, USA TODAY,
Mar. 4, 2003, at 3B. Other reasons for married couples to file separately include one spouse reneging on
child support payments or student loan payments, one spouse incurring an excessive amount of
unreimbursed medical expenses, and one spouse having an excessive amount of itemized deductions.
71
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 16.
72
I.R.S. Pub. No. 501, supra note 5, at 6. An overwhelming majority of couples file jointly. See I.R.S.
Pub. No. 1304, supra note 9, at tbl.1.2 (on average, only about 4% of couples filed separately from 2003 to
2006); MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 16 (“‘[M]arried, filing separately’ . . . is simply a clerical matter, and
rarely used, because almost every couple would pay more tax if the spouses filed this way.”).
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filing jointly will pay $12,375 (ignoring deductions, adjustments or credits).73 However,
if they file separately, the husband earning $60,000 and the wife $20,000, their combined
tax will be $13,770 (again, before any adjustments, deductions, or credits).74 This
increase of $1395 is illustrative of the increased tax liability that couples would face
filing separately, and thus 96% of couples choose joint filing.75
C. Congressional Efforts to Minimize the Secondary Earner Bias
¶26

Congress has recognized that joint filing is the best option for married couples, but
at the same time that it imposes serious economic costs on married women. Accordingly,
legislators have sought to address this problem in numerous ways over the course of the
past forty years. In 1964, Congress reduced the marginal income tax rate from 91% to
71%—eliminating some of the penalty associated with stacking the secondary earner’s
income on top of the primary earner’s income.76 In 1973, the Joint Economic Committee
of Congress held a session entitled Economic Problems of Women to discuss the income
tax consequences for working mothers in an effort to explore the problems and consider
additional possible solutions.77 In the late 1980s, another session entitled Tax Treatment
of Married, Head of Household, and Single Taxpayers was held by the House Ways and
Means Committee.78
¶27
Although the committees did not lead to actual reforms, in 198179 Congress sought
to directly address the secondary earner bias by enacting a credit for secondary earners
pursuant to Section 221 of the Economic and Tax Recovery Act of 1981 (Act).80 Under
the Act, marginal income tax rates were reduced to 50% and a credit for two-earner
couples was created.81 The credit allowed two-earner couples to deduct 5% in 1982 (and

73

See supra note 59 for the married filing jointly schedule.
See supra note 69 for the married filing separately schedule. The husband’s tax is $11,187.50. The
wife’s tax is $2582.50. Note that if each earned $40,000 per year for a total of $80,000 and filed separately
instead of jointly, each would incur income tax, before any adjustments, deductions or credits, of $6187.60.
Their total income tax would be $12,375. This is the same amount as if the couple had filed jointly.
However, this occurs when the earnings are the same for each spouse. This does not occur when one
spouse earns substantially more than the other spouse, as is the case for many couples in the United States
where the husband earns more than the wife.
75
I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304, supra note 9, at tbl.1.2.
76
Revenue Act of 1964, I.R.S. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964). Note that secondary earners are
heavily taxed by marginal tax rates.
77
Economic Problems of Women: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 93rd Cong. 240 (1973).
78
Id. Note that although Congress was having sessions that addressed the income tax impact of the
secondary earner, Congress did not enact any substantive legislative bills from 1969 to 1981. During the
Tax Treatment of Married, Head of Household and Single Taxpayers hearing, many researchers, advocates
and some congressmen promoted the idea of mandatory single filing or optional single filing for married
couples but with reduced tax consequences.
79
In 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit was created to encourage low-income parents to work. Under the
credit, working parents receive a stated amount for each child. The credit is refundable, meaning that even
if the parent(s)’ tax liability is zero, they can still receive the credit. See Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 970 (1975); see also Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571,
623–24 (1996); IRS.gov, It’s easier than ever to find out if you qualify for EITC,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
80
Pub. L. No 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). For further discussion of the Act, see S. REP. NO. 97-144 (1981).
81
Id.
74
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then 10% in 1983 and beyond) of the secondary earner’s income, up to a limit of
$30,000.82 The credit resulted in limited relief for secondary earners.83
¶28
Surprisingly, in the mid-1980s, women’s groups and social conservatives began
protesting the credit.84 Many felt that the credit was degrading to women and that
working mothers were being given an unfair tax advantage over women who chose not to
work.85 Helen M. Coyne, president of Mothers at Home, Inc., testified before Congress
that “America’s families want a Tax Code which is career neutral; that is, a code which
does not create an unfair economic advantage for either two-career families or families
choosing to have one spouse stay home.”86 Under political pressure, Congress repealed
the secondary earner credit in 1986.87
¶29
The failed credit, however, did not deter legislators from continued attempts to
reform the tax laws to eliminate the secondary earner bias. Perhaps the most noteworthy
mechanism for addressing the problem emerged in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.88
Under the Act, the maximum marginal income tax rate was lowered from 50% to 28%,
thereby drastically reducing bias.89 Since 1986, however, federal legislation has not been
enacted that would fully eliminate the bias for married women embedded in the tax
code.90
D. The Next Step: Looking Outside the United States for Answers
¶30

Congress has been unsuccessful in combating the secondary earner bias. Since the
Reagan administration, Congress has not focused extensively on lessening or eliminating
the secondary bias, because in most instances, the secondary bias is a woman’s issue.91
“Any attempt to change the law to ‘favor’ working wives is viewed as ‘social
engineering’ or as subverting ‘family values.’”92 Although Congress attempted to
eliminate the bias with a tax credit in 1981, this reform was repealed and, in any case, not
altogether effective. The adjustment of the marginal tax rates in and since the 1986 tax
reform was insufficient as well. Furthermore, the United States’ practice of aggregating
income under joint filing for married couples is rather uncommon in comparison with
82

I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (1981).
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 74–75.
84
Id. at 80. During President Clinton’s term, the marginal income tax rate was raised again to maximum of
39.6%. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (1993). Candidate
George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 for the re-institution of the secondary earner credit. See Maschka,
supra note 2. Between 2001 and 2003, President Bush reduced the marginal income tax rate to 35%. See
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001);
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
85
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 80.
86
Id.
87
Id. The repeal was most likely necessary because although the secondary earner credit was helpful, it
still had problems, such as a phase-out and time constraints. With a phase-out, a certain prescribed income
level earned either individually or jointly reduces the amount of a credit. Also, when enacting a tax-saving
vehicle such as a credit, the IRS will often place a time limit on when that measure can be used by the
taxpayer. See generally 47B C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 336 (2009), 33 Am. Jur. 2d Tax Credits § 1270
(2009).
88
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
89
Id.
90
See supra note 84.
91
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 80.
92
Id.
83
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other countries around the world.93 It is time to examine laws outside the United States
to identify alternative avenues for treating working married women under the IRC.
¶31
The remainder of this Comment focuses on tax reforms outside of the United
States, particularly in Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Each of these
countries have taken steps to ensure that their tax laws do not penalize working married
women. It is important to note that government actors often fail to take action on a
pressing social issue until pressured to do so. If there is any doubt that protests and
making one’s voice known against the secondary earner bias can lead to success, one
need only look at the impetus behind many of the tax reforms currently occurring around
the world.
III. EXAMINATION OF THE TAX REFORMS IN MALAYSIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND
IRELAND
¶32

In examining the tax reform measures of Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland, this section is structured to show the progression and extent of the tax reforms
concerning working married women in these countries. It begins by discussing
Malaysia’s system, where working married women possess the right to have their income
assessed in their own names, then moves to the United Kingdom, which has automatic
separate filing, and ends with a look at Ireland’s system, where working married women
can participate in a complex single assessment designation and have their income taxed
individually from their husbands without the couple incurring higher income taxes. For
each country, this Comment discusses a brief history of the tax reforms and illustrates
how each country’s current tax laws operate for married couples. Malaysia and the
United Kingdom were chosen to portray the measures in which the people of those
countries brought about tax reform. Ireland was chosen to be a direct example of how the
filing designations for married couples in the IRC should be structured.
A. Malaysia
1. Malaysia’s Treatment of Working Married Women

¶33

In 1957, Malaysia acquired its independence from Great Britain.94 Ten years later,
Malaysia created its personal income tax system.95 Initially, a married woman’s income
was combined with her husband’s income and filed in the husband’s name.96 Drawing on

93

Cathal O’Donoghue & Holly Sutherland, Accounting for the Family: The Treatment of Marriage and
Children in European Income Tax Systems, Innocenti Occasional Papers, Econ. & Social Policy Series, No.
65, 19–20, http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/eps65.pdf (“France, Portugal and Luxembourg are
the only countries [in the European Union] with mandatory joint taxation for couples for all incomes.”).
94
Terence P. Stewart & Margaret L.H. Png, The Growth Triangle of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia,
23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 20 (1993). In 1957, Malaysia was called the Federation of Malaya,
occupying a portion of southwest Asia. It was not until 1963 that Malaya and other areas in Asia, including
Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore, combined to form what is now known as Malaysia. Singapore separated
from Malaysia in 1965. Id.
95
Income Tax Act, 1967, Act 53, Part II, § 3 (Malay.) (Act No. 47 of 1967), available at
http://www.kpmg.com.my/kpmg/publications/tax/22/a0053.htm (amended multiple times since 1967).
96
Jeyapalan Kasipillai, Removing Gender Bias in the Malaysian Tax System, 40 TAX NOTES INT’L 255, 257
(2005). This provision fell under the Income Tax Ordinance No. 48 of 1967.
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the United Kingdom’s traditional model,97 Malaysia considered the married woman an
“incapacitated person” just like “any infant, lunatic, idiot or insane person.”98 During the
1970s, organizations such as the Malaysian Trade Union Congress and the United Malay
National Organisation Wanita lobbied the Malaysian government to change the tax laws
to make them more favorable to women.99 These groups asserted that “a working wife
should not be assessed under her husband’s name if she did not wish to be—just as his
income should not be assessed under her name.”100 Furthermore, “joint taxation was
neither neutral to marriage nor efficient because it often caused the tax liability of a
married couple to increase after marriage.”101 The Malaysian government responded
with a series of tax law amendments, beginning in 1974.102 By 1977, a Malaysian
married woman could elect to have her income assessed separately from her husband’s,
but only that part of her income which consisted of employment and professional
income.103 If a woman did not elect separate assessment of this income, then all of her
income was considered accumulated by her husband and filed in the husband’s name.104
¶34
In 1990, the Malaysian government amended Section 45(2) of the Income Tax Act
of 1967.105 This amendment gave the Malaysian married woman a unique right. Her
income was automatically assessed separately from her husband’s income unless she
chose to assign her tax liability to her husband.106 Under separate assessment, she likely
would be subject to lower marginal taxes than she otherwise would be as a secondary
earner.107 Additionally, in 1995, Malaysian married women were granted the option to
claim child relief.108 Prior to 1995, only the father or husband could claim child relief.109
¶35
Although there had been progress, many remained unsatisfied with the legal status
of women in Malaysia. Particularly, in 1999, Malaysian women’s organizations and
other individuals formed the Women’s Agenda for Change to curb the inequality
Malaysians faced in various facets of society and to promote women’s issues.110 Some of
the organization’s initiatives were to “[e]nact laws and policies to protect women from
globalisation [sic] and enhance participation through best practices in the workplace,
97

See infra notes 126 to 130.
Tan How Teck, Income Taxation of Husband and Wife in Singapore and Malaysia, 58 BULL. FOR INT’L
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 520, 521 (2004).
99
Id. at 523.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257. In 1974, married women were granted the right to elect separate
assessment of their employment income. In 1977, married women were granted the right to elect separate
assessment of their employment income and professional services income, which included “income from a
profession such as legal services, medical, and dental practices.” Id.
103
Id. at 257 (“All the income of a married woman from other sources, such as rental income, royalties, and
dividends, was aggregated with the total income of her husband.”).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
WOMEN’S AID ORG., WOMEN’S EQUALITY IN MALAYSIA STATUS REPORT (2001),
http://www.wao.org.my/news/20010301statusreport.htm#Culture&Religion (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
Women’s Agenda for Change focused on a number of issues pertaining to women including sexual
harassment and domestic violence.
98
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strategies against sexual harassment, and provision of child-care facilities.”111 Although
it is not entirely certain that the organization’s efforts accelerated the reforms, in 2000,
Malaysia further amended its tax treatment of married women. The Malaysian married
woman is now treated as a femme sole112 under Malaysia’s tax system.113 Malaysian tax
law presently gives a wife the choice of whether she wants her income assessed with her
husband’s income.114 If she does not elect to have her income aggregated with her
husband’s, then her income is assessed separately. If her income is assessed separately,
she is entitled to a personal deduction,115 applicable child relief credit,116 and spousal
dependent relief credit.117
¶36
There are some drawbacks to this provision. Implicit in the election of a separate
assessment without electing combined treatment is that a wife must make certain that her
husband does not elect combined treatment either. If he elects combined treatment, then
both of their incomes will be assessed in her name.118 Thus, the way in which the
Malaysian tax system treats married women is not altogether perfect. Still, the fact that
the Malaysian government amended its tax code multiple times to give Malaysian
111

Padmaja Padman, Pushing the Women's Agenda Forward, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), May 16, 1999,
available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/nst-cn.htm.
112
Femme Sole translates to a woman treated individually or by herself.
113
Jeyapalan Kasipillai, New Tax System Removes Gender Bias, STAR ONLINE (Malay.), May 12, 2007,
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/5/12/business/17641588&sec=.
114
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2000, § 608.9 (Malay.). Section 45(2) of the Income Tax Act 1967, as amended by
§ 608.9, states:
(2) Subject to this section, where an individual and his wife were living together in the basis year
for a year of assessment and did not in that basis year cease to live together or to be husband and
wife of each other--(a) the wife may elect in writing (wife who elects) that her total income shall
be aggregated with the total income of her husband and assessed in his name for that year of
assessment; or (b) the husband may elect in writing (husband who elects) that his total income
shall be aggregated with the total income of his wife and assessed in her name for that year of
assessment: Provided that where the wife who elects or the husband who elects is not resident for
the basis year for a year of assessment, such wife or husband, as the case may be, may elect under
this subsection only if she or he is a citizen.
For the purposes of paragraph (2)(b)-(a) for any year of assessment, that paragraph shall only apply if there is no election made by
a wife or wives under paragraph (2)(a) for that year of assessment; and
(b) the election shall only be made with one wife.[]; and . . . (4) Where under subsection (2)
the total income of the wife who elects falls to be aggregated with that of her husband or the
total income of the husband who elects falls to be aggregated with that of his wife, for a year
of assessment, the wife who elects or the husband who elects, as the case may be, shall be
treated as having no chargeable income for that year.
115
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY COMMERCE 2006: MALAYSIA: PERSONAL TAXES:
DETERMINATION OF TAXABLE INCOME (2006), available at 2006 WL 10053338.
116
Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257.
117
Finance (No. 2) Act of 2000, Malaysia Act 608.9 (Malay.). The spousal dependent relief is a credit that
either spouse can use if the other spouse elects for combined treatment or has no taxable income for the
year. Thus, if the husband elects combined treatment or the husband has no taxable income for the tax
year, the wife can use the dependent relief credit. The spousal dependent credit for 2007 amounted to RM
3000 (in Malaysian currency). It is possible for the husband to have greater tax savings regardless of
whether his wife files with him or separately. The credit for the husband produces this potential result.
The same treatment is given to the husband if the wife elects combined treatment or the wife has no taxable
income for the year. In a case where the husband has several wives, the husband can apply the credit to
only one wife.
118
Id.
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married women options is remarkable for a country in which women and men are not
considered equal under most laws.119 In fact, the cultural norm in Malaysia is that
married women will remain in the home and raise the children.120
¶37
Undoubtedly, though, the Malaysian government has taken profound steps to lessen
gender bias in its tax laws. “The introduction of independent taxation of a wife beginning
in 1990 recognizes the contribution of women to the well-being of the country.”121
Consequently, married women have a better position than they previously had, primarily
because they can now make more choices. Malaysian tax laws place married women “at
the bargaining table” to discuss with their husbands not only how their income should be
treated but also what would be best for the family as whole.
2. Illustrating Malaysia’s Tax Code
¶38

This section illustrates how three Malaysian couples are taxed under the Malaysian
tax code and determines whether the secondary earner bias arises in any of these cases.
The first example involves a couple that selects combined treatment, the second example
involves a couple in which each spouse earns the same salary but they opt out of
combined treatment, and the third example involves a couple that opts out of combined
treatment but the husband earns substantially more than the wife. In all three examples,
the applicable deductions and credits are excluded to focus on the differences in spousal
and base tax liability. The Malaysian progressive income tax schedule122 is employed for
119

WOMEN’S AID ORGANIZATION, WOMEN’S EQUALITY IN MALAYSIA STATUS REPORT (2001),
http://www.wao.org.my/news/20010301statusreport.htm#Culture&Religion.
120
Id. Between 1998 and 2006, women averaged 36% of Malaysia’s workforce; see table below.
International Labour Organization, LABORSTA Database, Malaysia—Tbl. 2A: Employment General
Level, available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). Note that this data represents a
sampled survey.
Malaysian Workforce

Men
Women
Total
% of
Women in
Workforce

1998
5,718,900
2,880,700
8,599,600

1999
5,851,200
2,986,600
8,837,800

2000
6,086,300
3,235,500
9,321,700

2001
6,055,900
3,301,100
9,357,000

2002
6,141,800
3,400,800
9,542,600

2003
6,323,600
3,546,100
9,869,700

2004
6,390,400
3,589,100
9,979,500

2005
6,470,500
3,574,800
10,045,400

2006
6,618,600
3,656,800
10,275,400

33%

34%

35%

35%

36%

36%

36%

36%

36%

121

Kasipillai, supra note 96, at 257.
The income tax rate schedule for Malaysia is included below. Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia,
Individual, Income Tax Rate, Year 2008,
http://www.hasil.gov.my/lhdnv3e/individuIndex.jsp?process=21000&menu=13&expandable=1 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009). Note that income is in ringgit (RM), the Malaysian currency.

122

Taxable Income
On the first
On the next
On the first
On the next
On the first
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RM
2,500
2,500
5,000
15,000
20,000

Rate
0%
1%
3%
-

Tax (RM)
0
25
25
450
475
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each example to compute the taxes due. The average effective tax rate123 is calculated as
well.
Example One: Consider a Malaysian couple who earns 80,000 RM (approximately
$21,913)124 for the taxable year. If the couple elects combined assessment in one
spouse’s name, or if one of them did not earn any income during the taxable year, leaving
only one spouse’s income to be assessed, their tax liability would be 9675 RM
(approximately $2650), with an average effective tax rate of 12%. The couple is exposed
to a marginal income tax rate of 24%. However, if the wife, for example, decides to
work and opts to have her income assessed separately, the couple’s taxes are likely to be
lower, as shown in the following examples.
Example Two: Consider a Malaysian couple in which each spouse earns the same
income, for instance 40,000 RM (approximately $10,957), totaling 80,000 RM
(approximately $21,913). If they are assessed separately, their tax liability equals 2175
RM (approximately $596) each, totaling 4350 RM (approximately $1192). This is 5325
RM (approximately $1459), less than if they had elected combined treatment. The
average effective tax rate for each spouse is 5% and each spouse is exposed to a marginal
income tax rate of 13%.
Example Three: Lastly, consider a Malaysian couple in which the wife earns
substantially less than her husband, for instance 20,000 RM (approximately $5478) and
the husband earns 60,000 RM (approximately $16,435), totaling 80,000 RM
(approximately $21,913). If they are assessed separately, the taxes due would be 475 RM
(approximately $130) for the wife (average effective tax rate of 2%, marginal income tax
rate of 3%) and 4125 RM (approximately $1230) for the husband (average effective tax
rate of 7%, marginal income tax rate of 19%). Their total tax is 4600 RM (approximately
$1260), which is 5075 RM (approximately $1390) less than if they had elected combined
treatment.
These three examples suggest that there is no secondary earner bias in the
Malaysian system, especially when couples are assessed separately. The only instance in
which there might be a secondary earner bias is in Example One where the couple elects

On the next
On the first
On the next
On the first
On the next
On the first
On the next
On the first
On the next
On the first
On the next
On the first
Exceeding

15,000
35,000
15,000
50,000
20,000
70,000
30,000
100,000
50,000
150,000
100,000
250,000
250,000

7%
13%
19%
24%
27%
27%
28%

1050
1525
1950
3475
3800
7275
7200
14,475
13,500
27,975
27,000
54,975
-

123

For the formula for average effective tax rate, see supra note 61.
Income is in ringgit (RM), the Malaysian currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of March
21, 2009. See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
124
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combined treatment and is exposed to marginal income tax rate of 24%. However, this
outcome does not necessary control because the wife can opt out of joint filing.
B. United Kingdom
1. The United Kingdom’s Treatment of Working Married Women
In 1799, the United Kingdom125 created its tax system and instituted joint filing for
married couples.126 Between 1799 and 1990, the United Kingdom’s income tax system
contained gender bias in favor of the husband.127 Only the married man possessed the
right to file a joint return for his wife and himself.128 If, during the tax year, the married
woman earned any income and even if she elected to have that income assessed
separately under the Wife’s Earning Election,129 her non-labor income, including her
investment income, was still attributed to her husband.130 Although there were many
reforms to the tax system prior to 1990, including the Married Women’s Property Act in
1882,131 provisions to allow a married women’s income to have the same tax relief
provisions as those of single filers,132 and the Finance Act 1978,133 many married and
unmarried women in the United Kingdom felt that the reforms were insufficient.134
¶44
John A. Kay and Mervyn A. King, authors of The British Tax System, declared,
“[t]he British system rests on the dependency principle. The wife’s income is simply
treated as if it were the husband’s, and in recognition of the burden which she imposes on
¶43

125

The United Kingdom is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United Kingdom, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/uk.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
126
Janet G. Stotsky, Gender Bias in Tax Systems, 14 TAX NOTES INT’L 1913, 1917 (1997).
127
Note that the legal norm for eighteenth century common law was that “the husband and wife became
one person by marriage, and common law added the rider that the husband became that person.” 52 JOHN
HODDINOTT & CHRISTOPHER ADAM, INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., TESTING NASH BARGAINING
HOUSEHOLD MODELS WITH TIME-SERIES DATA 3 (1998), available at
http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/sites/default/files/publications/dp52.pdf (internal quotation omitted).
128
Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1917.
129
Previously, the United Kingdom instituted a Wife’s Earnings Election whereby the wife could have her
income, excluding investment income, taxed separately from her husband’s income. The election was
abolished in 1990 due to the creation of independent filing. Additional requirements for the Wife’s
Earnings Election and separate assessment include “the couple are married and living together, and all the
income of the wife would be treated as that of the husband for tax purposes but for the election.” HM
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL: WIFE’S EARNINGS ELECTION,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/re1400c.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
130
Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1917.
131
Id. at 1917. (The Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 “allowed women to retain management and
control of their separate property and earnings.” The 1978 Finance Act “gave married women the right to
receive their own withholding repayments.”).
132
Id. Previously, the United Kingdom instituted separate assessment whereby the wife could opt to have
her income taxed separately from her husband’s income. Separate assessment was abolished in 1990 due to
the creation of independent filing. Additional requirements for separate assessment include that “the
couple are married and living together, and the income of the wife is treated as that of the husband for tax
purposes.” See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL: SEPARATE ASSESSMENT:
WHEN CAN SEPARATE ASSESSMENT APPLY, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/RE1312.htm (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
133
Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1917–18 (the 1978 Finance Act “gave married women the right to receive
their own withholding repayments”).
134
Id.
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him he receives a specially enhanced personal allowance.”135 In the late 1970s and
1980s, many other commentators and academics demanded that the United Kingdom’s
government amend the tax laws in recognition of women.136 After reading about the tax
laws in periodicals such as the United Kingdom’s Sunday Times and Woman’s Own, over
36,000 readers registered to protest the tax laws.137 Parliament responded to the public,
organizations, and commentators by amending the tax laws in favor of women. Through
the Finance Act of 1988, which became effective in 1990, Parliament first authorized
separate filing for married couples.138
¶45
Under current regulations,139 independent taxation stipulates that “the incomes of a
husband and wife are assessed separately in any case.”140 Thus, there is automatic
independent filing for each spouse. Each spouse is entitled to applicable allowances to
reduce his or her tax liability.141
¶46
The United Kingdom’s tax code still contains gender bias. For instance, consider
the married couple’s allowance.142 The married couple’s allowance, equivalent to a tax
135

JOHN A. KAY & MERVYN A. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 206 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2d ed. 1980).
Stotsky, supra note 126, at 1918.
137
Norma Briggs, Individual Income Taxation and Social Benefits in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
U.S.A.: A Study of Their Interrelationships and Their Effects on Lower-Income Couples and Single Heads
of Households, 39 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 243, 244 (1985) (internal quotation omitted).
138
Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/ukpga_19880039_en_4#pt3-ch1-pb2. Note that the Finance Act of
1988 has been amended multiple times.
139
Income Tax Act, 2007, c. 3, § 45–55 (Eng.), available at
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/legResults.aspx?LegType=All%20Primary&PageNumber=1&BrowseLetter=
I&NavFrom=1&activeTextDocId=3309124.
140
HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RELIEF INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL: SEPARATE ASSESSMENT: WHEN CAN
SEPARATE ASSESSMENT APPLY, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/RE1312.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2009).
141
HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RATES AND ALLOWANCES – INCOME TAX,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/it.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). Note the following table is pounds (£),
United Kingdom’s currency. Applicable credits/allowances include:
136

Income Tax Allowances
2007–08
2008–09
2009–10
Personal Allowance
£5225
£6035
£6475
Personal Allowance for people aged 65–74(1)
£7550
£9030
£9490
Personal Allowance for people aged 75 and over(1)
£7690
£9180
£9640
Married Couple’s Allowance (born before 6th April 1935 £6285
£6535
Not
but aged under 75)(1)(2)(3)
applicable
Married Couple’s Allowance (aged 75 and over)(1)(2)
£6365
£6625
£6965
Income limit for age-related allowances
£20,900
£21,800
£22,900
Minimum amount of Married Couple’s Allowance
£2440
£2540
£2670
Blind Person’s Allowance
£1730
£1800
£1890
(1) These allowances reduce where the income is above the income limit – by £1 for every £2 of
income above the limit. However they will never be less than the basic Personal Allowance or
minimum amount of Married Couple’s Allowance.
(2) Tax relief for the Married Couple's allowance is given at the rate of 10 per cent.
(3) In the 2009–10 tax year all Married Couple's Allowance claimants in this category will become 75
at some point during the year and will therefore be entitled to the higher amount of the allowance - for
those aged 75 and over.
142
Income Tax Act, 2007, c. 3, § 45–55 (Eng.), available at
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/legResults.aspx?LegType=All%20Primary&PageNumber=1&BrowseLetter=
I&NavFrom=1&activeTextDocId=3309124. The Income Tax Act of 2007 further defined the married
couple’s allowance:
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credit in the IRC, can reduce each spouse’s income tax liability.143 The qualifications for
the allowance are based on when the couple wed and the age of the spouses.144
Specifically, if the couple wed before December 5, 2005, and at least one spouse was
born before April 6, 1935, then only the husband can use the allowance to reduce his tax
liability.145 If the couple wed after December 5, 2005, or are in a civil partnership and at
least one spouse was born before April 6, 1935, “the person with the higher income can
claim Married Couple’s Allowance.”146 As in the United States, women in the United
Kingdom earn less than men on average.147 Thus, it is likely that it is the husband who
can initially claim the married couple’s allowance.
¶47
Yet, the married couple’s allowance should not be dismissed. According to the
provisions of the married couple’s allowance, one spouse can transfer any unused portion
of the allowance to the other spouse.148 Thus, with independent filing, the wife can still
use the married couple’s allowance to reduce her own tax liability, but likely only after
the husband has used a portion of it. This treatment of an allowance or credit is
completely unlike the IRC’s credits for married couples filing separately. Under the IRC,
if the wife decides to file separately from her husband, she and her husband would, in
most instances, not be able to employ the Hope and Lifetime Educational Credits, Child
and Dependent Care Credit, Adoption Credit, and Elderly and Disabled Credit.149
§ 46 Marriages and civil partnerships on or after 5 December 2005
(1) If an individual—
(a) makes a claim for a tax year, and
(b) meets the conditions set out in subsection (2), the individual is entitled to a tax
reduction for the tax year of 10% of the amount specified in subsection (3)(a) or (b)(as
applicable).
(2) The conditions are that—
(a) for the whole or part of the tax year the individual is married or in a civil
partnership and is living with the spouse or civil partner,
(b) the marriage took place, or the civil partnership was formed, on or after 5
December 2005 or, if the marriage took place before that date, an election for the new
rules to apply is in force for the tax year,
(c) the individual, or the spouse or civil partner, was born before 6 April 1935,
(d) the individual meets the requirements of section 56 (residence etc), and
(e) the individual's net income for the tax year exceeds that of the spouse or civil
partner or, if they have the same amount of net income for the tax year, the individual
is specified in an election as the person to be entitled to relief under this section for the
year.
Id.

143

HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, MARRIED COUPLE’S ALLOWANCE – INCLUDES CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/married-allow.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). See supra note 141 for
the amount.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Kate Bell, Tackling Discrimination Head On, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Aug. 13, 2008,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/tackling_discrimination.html/index.html (“Women in the
United Kingdom earn on average 16 percent less than men for every hour they work—a significant penalty,
though it falls below the 23 percent gap between women and men in the United States.”).
148
HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, MARRIED COUPLE’S ALLOWANCE – INCLUDES CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/married-allow.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). Married couples who
file separately can also “share” the Blind Couple’s Allowance.
149
See IRS.gov, Topic 600: Tax Credits, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc600.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2009).
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2. Illustrating the United Kingdom’s Tax Code

¶48

¶49

¶50

¶51

¶52

The issue of secondary earner bias does not customarily arise for working married
women in the United Kingdom because each spouse is taxed individually.150 There is no
combination of income in which one spouse’s income is stacked up on top of the other’s,
with the income on the highest level exposed to high marginal taxes. Instead, each
spouse’s income is taxed according to his or her own marginal income tax rate based on
that spouse’s income. This is proven in the following examples. Each example excludes
applicable allowances and employs the United Kingdom’s progressive income tax rate
schedule for 2008-2009.151
Example One: Consider that only the husband works, earning a salary of £80,000
(approximately $115,707).152 He will be taxed individually and owe incomes taxes of
£32,000 (approximately $46,283). If the wife decides to enter the workforce, her income
taxes will be taxed individually, not considering her husband’s income.
Example Two: If both the wife and the husband work, earning identical incomes of
£40,000 (approximately $57,854), they will be taxed individually, owe the same income
tax of £16,000 (approximately $23,141), and be exposed to the same marginal and
effective tax rates.
Example Three: Consider that the husband earns £60,000 (approximately $86,780),
which is substantially higher than the wife’s earnings of £20,000 (approximately
$28,927). The basis of each spouse’s income tax liability is each spouse’s individual
income, not the combined income of the couple. The husband will owe £24,000
(approximately $34,712), while the wife will owe £4000 (approximately $5785). Each
will be exposed to individual marginal and effective tax rates that are not determinate
upon the other spouse’s income.
As previously stated, these examples indicate that there is no evident secondary
earner bias for either spouse because each spouse’s income is assessed separately when
150

Note, though, that studies indicate that couples are shifting investment income or unearned income to
the spouse with the lower marginal income tax rate, usually the wife, to decrease or avoid tax liability.
Assuming that the investment income belongs to the husband, this shifting could be occurring because the
husband maintains a dominant position in the couple which leads to the wife feeling as though she is
secondary or could lead to secondary earner bias if the wife is placed in higher marginal tax bracket/band.
See Melvin Stephens, Jr. & Jennifer Ward-Batts, The Impact of Separate Taxation on the Intra-Household
Allocation of Assets: Evidence from the UK, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1989, 1995 (2004), available at
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/melvins/ukassets_final.pdf (“In many households, this reform
[independent taxation] created an incentive to transfer a portion or even all of the household’s assets to the
wife since she faces the lower marginal tax rate. If she works very little or not at all, then the asset income
shifted to her may not be taxed at all.”).
151
The following table is in pounds (£), United Kingdom’s currency, and portrays current United Kingdom
income tax rates (called Taxable Bands). See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, RATES AND ALLOWANCES –
INCOME TAX, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/it.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
Taxable Bands
Starting Rate: 10%
Basic Rate: 20%
Higher Rate: 40%

2008–2009 (£)
0–2320
0–34,800
Over 34,800

152
Income is in pounds (£), the British currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of Mar. 21,
2009. See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009).
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marginal and effective tax rates are not determinate upon the other spouse’s income.
Thus, individual filing should relieve working married women of the secondary earner
bias.
C. Ireland
1. Ireland’s Treatment of Working Married Women
¶53

Although Ireland acquired its independence from the United Kingdom in 1949,
Ireland initially carried over the United Kingdom’s income tax laws into its own
system.153 As such, there was initially gender bias in the tax code.154 If married women
did work, their income was considered earned by the husband.155 Additionally, before
the mid-1990s, Ireland applied a heavy marginal tax rate to labor, which directly affected
secondary earners.156 Thus, it cost families extra to have a secondary earner in the
household. However, as in Malaysia and the United Kingdom, Ireland began to
recognize the importance of secondary earners, usually married women, in the labor
force. “To improve secondary earners’ incentives to enter work, Ireland is switching
gradually from a joint to an individual assessment of married couple income.”157
¶54
In 1993, Ireland expanded the filing status options for married couples.158 Ireland
allocated a special filing for married couples who wanted their income to be assessed
separately. This designation is called separate assessment.159 In 1993, Ireland “moved
from joint filing in the name of the husband with an option for separate assessment on
153

Under Section 2 of the Republic Act of 1948, Ireland acquired complete independence from the United
Kingdom. The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948 (Act No. 22/1978), § 2 (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1948/en/act/pub/0022/sec0002.html#zza22y1948s2. The Irish tax statutes at
this time referenced British income tax laws and how the statutes amended the British laws. See
14/04/1923: Double Taxation (Relief) 1923, Order No. 1, sched. Part I, (a) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1923/en/si/v10pg829.html (“Relief shall be allowed from British Income
Tax in accordance with and under the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Finance Act, 1920, subject
to the proviso that for the purpose of determining the Dominion rate of tax.”).
154
See supra note 127.
155
See Income Tax Act, 1967, Part IX, c. 1, § 192 (1) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1967/en/act/pub/0006/sec0192.html#zza6y1967s192 (“[A] woman’s income
chargeable to tax shall, so far as it is income for a year of assessment or part of a year of assessment during
which she is a married woman living with her husband, be deemed for income tax (including sur-tax)
purposes to be his income and not to be her income.”).
156
See Isabelle Joumard, Tax Systems in European Union Countries, 34 OECD ECON. STUD. 91, 98–104
(2001), available at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/Taxes/OECD%20EU%20tax%20systems%2002.pdf.
157
Id. at 101.
158
Finance Act, 1993, (Act No. 13/1993), c. III, § 10(1) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1993/en/act/pub/0013/sec0010.html#zza13y1993s10:
(2) Subsection (3) shall apply for a year of assessment where, in the case of a husband and wife
who are living together—
(a) (i) an election (including an election deemed to have been duly made) by the husband and wife
to be assessed to tax in accordance with the provisions of section 194 has effect in relation to that
year of assessment, and
(ii) the husband and the wife by notice in writing jointly given to the inspector before the 6th day
of July in that year of assessment elect that the wife should be assessed to tax in accordance with
the provisions of section 194 . . . .
159
Janet G. Stotsky, How Tax Systems Treat Men and Women Differently, 34 FIN. & DEV. 30, 30 (1997),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/03/pdf/stotsky.pdf.
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labor income for the wife, to an option for the wife to be the ‘primary taxpayer.’”160
Under separate assessment, each spouse files his or her taxes individually but is still
treated as married.161 The couple shares equally the following personal tax credits:
married tax credit, age tax credit, blind person’s tax credit, and incapacitated child tax
credit.162 The remaining available tax credits, reliefs, and exemptions163 are allocated
based on the cost incurred by the spouse.164 Furthermore, the “standard rate band up to
€45,400 can be transferred to the other spouse, but only at the end of the tax year.”165
Therefore, €45,400 (approximately $61,988)166 of the couple’s income is taxed in the
lower tax bracket or band of 20%, if only one spouse works. If both spouses work, up to
€72,800 (approximately $99,399) can be taxed in the lower tax bracket of 20%.167
Spouses can choose to be separately assessed by making the election orally or in
writing.168
160

Id.
In Ireland, the income tax schedules are based on whether an individual is married. The income tax
schedule for married couples focuses on whether both spouses work or not. Irish Tax and Customs, IT2 –
Taxation of Married Couples, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept.
22, 2009).
The standard rate band for married couples for 2009 is €45,400 subject to an increase of up to €27,400
when both spouses are working. The increase is limited to the lower of €27,400 or the amount of the
income of the spouse with the smaller income. This increase is not transferable between spouses.
In other words, if both spouses are working, up to €72,800 (45,400 + 27,400) can be taxed at the lower
tax rate of 20%. However, the €27,400 is limited to lower of €27,400 or the income of the lower earning
spouse. Id. The following table portrays the income tax rate schedule for married couples in the Euro (€),
Ireland’s currency. See Finance (No. 2) Act, 2008, c. 3, § 4, Tbl., Part 3 (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2008/en/act/pub/0025/sec0004.html#sec4.
161

2009 Income Tax Schedule for Married Couples:
2009 Income Tax Schedule for Married
Couples: One Spouse Works
Both Spouses Work
Rate
Income Band (€)
Rate
Income Band (€)
20%
0 – 45,400
20%
0 – 72,800*
41%
Balance over 45,400
41%
Balance over 72,800
*27,400 of the 72,800 is limited to the lower of 27,400 or the income of the lower earning spouse.
162

A married person’s taxed credit is allowed in the first year of marriage. After the first year of marriage,
the couple must choose whether they want to be jointly assessed, separately assessed, or singly assessed.
See Irish Tax and Customs, Married Persons Taxation, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/marriedpersons-taxation.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
163
The remaining tax credits, reliefs, and exemptions include dependent relative credit, health expenses
credit, guide dog allowance, rent credit, artist’s relief, loan interest relief, etc. See Irish Tax and Customs,
Tax Credits, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009); Irish Tax and
Customs, Reliefs and Exemptions, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/reliefs/index.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2009).
164
Irish Tax and Customs, Married Persons Taxation, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/marriedpersons-taxation.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
165
Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). See also supra
note 161.
166
Income is in Euros (€), Ireland’s currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of March 21, 2009.
See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last visited Sept.
22, 2009).
167
See supra note 161. The additional €27,400 rate band allowed to be taxed at the lower income tax rate
of 20% is not transferable under separate assessment.
168
Id.
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¶55

Due to the enactment of separate assessment in Ireland, married couples presently
can choose from three forms of filing: single assessment (each spouse is treated and taxed
as a single individual), joint assessment (spouses income are combined and tax is
assessed in one spouse’s name), and separate assessment (each spouse’s taxes are
independent of the other spouse’s).169 Under single assessment, the married person is
treated as a single individual and taxed at the single rates.170 Additionally, “[o]ne spouse
cannot claim relief for payments made by the other and there is no right to transfer tax
credits or standard rate band to each other.”171
¶56
When assessing the income jointly, a couple decides which spouse’s name to use
for the assessment of both incomes.172 If a couple does not nominate a spouse, the spouse
with the highest amount of income in the previous year is deemed the assessed spouse.173
A couple can transfer credits and the standard rate band or bracket to suit their
circumstances.174 Unlike joint filing in the IRC, there is no stacking of income, because
the spouses can use the lower income tax rate on both incomes.
¶57
As stated previously, separate assessment allows a couple to have their taxes
computed individually with access to available credits and the standard tax band.175 If no
choice is made as to how a couple wants to be assessed, joint assessment is automatically
enforced.176 The filings are illustrated in the next section.
¶58
Although Ireland’s separate assessment benefits married women, critics argue that
Ireland’s effective tax rate on secondary earners remains too high.177 Additionally,
Ireland promotes joint assessment above separate and single assessment.178 However, a
169

Id.
Id. The following table is in the Euro (€), Ireland’s currency. See Finance (No. 2) Act 2008, ch. 3, § 4,
tbl. Part 1 (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2008/en/act/pub/0025/sec0004.html#sec4.
170

2009 Income Tax Rates for Singles
Rate
20%
41%
171

Income Band (€)
0 – 36,400*
Balance over 36,400

Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). The standard rate
band for married couples for 2009 is €45,400.
172
Id. See supra note 161 for the tax schedule for married couples.
173
Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
174
Id. Under Joint Assessment, the tax credits and standard rate band can be allocated between spouses to
suit their circumstances. For example: “If only one spouse has taxable income, all tax credits and the
standard rate band will be given to him or her.” Id. “If both spouses have taxable income, they can decide
which spouse is to be the assessable spouse and request their local Revenue office to allocate the tax credits
and standard rate band between them in whatever way they wish. [PAYE tax credit, employment expenses,
and the basic standard rate band of €27,400 are non transferable.]” Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Boris Cournede, Removing Obstacles to Employment for Women in Ireland 7 (OECD Econ. Dep’t,
Working Paper No. 511, 2006), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00003C72/$FILE/JT03212998.PDF (“For a Dublinbased family with two young children where one spouse works and earns the average production wage
(APW), there is little point for the other spouse to take up a job paid at two-thirds of the APW: the effective
‘tax plus childcare’ rate is 93%.”)
178
Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009) (“Joint Assessment
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fundamental benefit of Ireland’s separate assessment is that spouses can transfer excess
allowances and credits in order to lower their overall tax rate. A couple decides how they
want to allocate their tax liability. Most importantly, Ireland’s tax system takes into
account the working married woman. As previously stated, Ireland allocates an
additional amount of income, €27,400 (approximately $37,411), to the lower earning
spouse or secondary earner, who likely is the married woman,179 and taxes that income at
the lowest tax rate. Thus, unlike the United States, in Ireland, the secondary earner’s
income is not initially taxed at high marginal tax rates. This is a noteworthy provision
because it shows that the Irish government recognizes and will not penalize secondary
earners.
2. Illustrating Ireland’s Tax Code
¶59

In this section, three illustrative couples are taxed under each of Ireland’s filing
options: single assessment, joint assessment, and separate assessment, exclusive of
applicable tax credits and exemptions and applying the assumption that the couple has
been married for over a year.180 The average effective tax rate181 is calculated and the
appropriate income tax schedule is employed.182 The income tax due is the same under
separate assessment and joint filing, because the spouses are treated as married and taxed
accordingly.183 The point is to show whether the lower earning spouse, the wife,
experiences the secondary earner bias.
¶60
Example One: Consider a couple where only the husband works earning a salary of
€80,000 (approximately $109,230).184 The taxes due will be €25,156 (approximately
$34,347) under single assessment, and €23,266 (approximately $31,767) under separate
and joint assessment. The additional tax liability under single assessment is not the only
determinative factor for this couple. Remember, with single assessment, the couple
cannot transfer tax credits185 or the lower income tax rate among each other; hence, the
couple is likely unable to reduce their income tax liability. Thus, the issue with this
(also known as aggregation) is usually the most favourable basis of assessment for a married couple.”).
179
See Herwig Immervoll et al., An Evaluation of the Tax-Transfer Treatment of Married Couples in
European Countries, 33 tbl.1 (Econ. Pol’y Research Unit, Univ. of Copenhagen, Working Paper No. 200803, 2008), available at http://www.econ.ku.dk/eprn_epru/Workings_Papers/wp-08-03.pdf (noting that in
Ireland, for two-earner couples, of the secondary earners, the spouses that earned less income, seventyeight percent were women.).
180
Note, however, that the calculations would be different if the couple was married in the current tax year.
See Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
181
For the formula for average effective tax rate, see supra note 61.
182
For the income tax rate schedule for singles, see supra note 170. For the income tax rate schedule for
married couples, see supra note 161.
183
Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). The tax liability
will be the same because married couples apply the same income tax rate schedule under separate and joint
assessment. See supra note 161 for the tax schedule.
184
Income is in Euros (€), Ireland’s currency, with approximate US dollar equivalent as of March 21, 2009.
See MSN Money, http://moneycentral.msn.com/detail/stock_quote?Symbol=/MYRUS (last visited Sept.
22, 2009).
185
For instance, the Home Carer’s Tax Credit is only available if the couple files jointly. See Irish Tax and
Customs, Home Carer’s Tax Credit, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/home-carers.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009).

449

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

¶61

¶62

¶63

¶64

[2009

couple is not a secondary earner bias issue, but what filing option is best to reduce the
couple’s taxes. The next two examples examine when the wife decides to work.
Example Two: Now consider a couple in which the wife and husband earn the
same salary of €40,000 (approximately $54,615), totaling €80,000 (approximately
$109,230). Regardless of whether the couple files under single assessment, joint
assessment, or separate assessment, the total tax due for the couple will be €17,512
(approximately $23,910). The issue in this case is how the tax liability is allocated
among the spouses and what marginal and effective tax rates affect each spouse. If the
couple chooses single assessment with no transfer of tax credits and the lower tax rate,
each will owe taxes of €8756 (approximately $11,955), and each is exposed to a marginal
income tax of 41% and average effective tax rate of 22%. However, under joint and
separate assessment, the couple can decide whose income, if any, will be shielded from
the high tax rate of 41%.186 Thus, the spouses are able to decide by themselves who will
incur the higher tax or penalty and what will be their individual effective tax rates.
Example Three: Finally, consider a couple in which the husband earns €60,000
(approximately $81,022) and wife earns €20,000 ($27,307). If the couple files under
single assessment, the total income tax liability is €20,959. This equals income taxes of
€16,956 ($23,151), with a portion of income taxed in the higher bracket of 41%, and an
average effective tax rate of 28% for the husband, and €4000 (approximately $5461),
with all income taxed in the lower bracket of 20%, and an average effective tax rate of
20% for the wife. Under joint and separate assessment, the total income tax liability of
the couple is €19,066 (approximately $26,032). However, if the couple decides to file
under separate assessment, the tax liability of the husband is €15,066 (approximately
$20,571), with a portion of income taxed at the higher rate of 41%, and an average
effective tax rate of 25%, and the liability of the wife is €4,000 (approximately $5461),
with all income taxed at the lower rate of 20%, and an average effective tax rate of 20%.
Under each filing option, the wife, the secondary earner, is not exposed to high marginal
taxes and thus, is not penalized for working.
These examples show that if a married woman is a secondary earner in Ireland, she
is not likely to experience the secondary earner bias. As the spouse with the lower
earnings, she will be taxed in the lower tax bracket. This is primarily due to two reasons.
First, with single assessment, her income is always initially taxed in the lowest tax
bracket and her marginal income tax is not related to her husband’s income. Second,
with joint and separate assessment, although the couple can allocate up to €72,800 taxed
at the lower tax rate, only €45,400 is transferable between the spouses and the other
€27,400 is applied towards the income of the lower earning spouse.
Problems could arise in implementing Ireland’s income tax filing structure into the
IRC. The main concerns would be how the United States’ progressive tax structure
would adhere to both spouses being able to divide the same credits, and that the income
tax would not exactly be the same under joint filing and separate assessment. These
concerns are addressed below.

186

Since both spouses work, up to €72,800 of their income can be taxed against the lower band or bracket
of 20%. The couple’s choices include taxing all of one spouse’s income and €32,800 of the other spouse’s
income at 20% with the remaining €7,200 taxed at 41% or proportioning the €72,800 under a method they
create.
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IV. THE PROPOSAL

¶65

Married working women should be able to make the choice of entering, re-entering,
or remaining in the workforce without worrying about whether their income will be lost
to income taxes. It is understandable that if both spouses choose to work, their income
taxes should be greater than that of a family with a sole earner. However, this must be
implemented in the IRC in a way that properly recognizes, rather than penalizes, the
income of secondary earners. That is what this proposal accomplishes. This proposal
integrates the methods that produced tax reform in Malaysia and the United Kingdom
with the filing structure of Ireland to mitigate or even eliminate the gender discrimination
effects of the secondary earner bias contained within the IRC. None of these countries’
tax systems are perfect. Yet, we can still learn from them and apply the parts that are
commendatory for working married women.
A. Lessons from Malaysia and the United Kingdom

¶66

The systems in Malaysia and the United Kingdom teach us that organizing and
publicly protesting for the removal of the secondary earner bias produces results.
Consider Malaysia, a country where women’s rights were and continue to be infringed
upon and, basically, disregarded. Still, women and organizations were able to influence
the government to recognize secondary earners in the tax law.187 Recall what occurred in
the United Kingdom. The fact that the United Kingdom’s tax code discriminated against
women as secondary earners was published in a national newspaper and magazine.188
After reading this, 36,000 readers protested the tax laws and the United Kingdom
amended them.189
¶67
This can occur in the United States. Working married women in the United States
will continue to be considered secondary earners and penalized for filing both jointly
with and separately from their husbands until women decide to make a change and have
their voices heard by the government. In a society such as Malaysia, where women’s
rights continue to be limited, women and organizations fought and still fight for removal
of gender bias in the tax code. Yet, in the United States, a country whose ideals rest on
equal rights for all, the discriminatory effects of gender bias remain in the tax code.
People should organize and protest to have the tax laws changed.
B. Lessons from Ireland
¶68

Under this proposal, the IRC will include three filing choices for married couples:
married filing separately, married filing jointly, and separate assessment. This is similar
to Ireland’s tax structure for married couples. The married filing separately and the
married filing jointly IRC language, procedures, and tax rates will remain the same as
they currently are in the IRC. For the inclusion of the separate assessment, the language
of Section 1(d)190 of the IRC should be amended. The language should be changed to:
187

WOMEN’S AID ORG., supra note 110.
Briggs, supra note 137.
189
Id.
190
By including the separate assessment designation, the remaining subsections in I.R.C. §1 will move
down a letter. Thus, “married individuals filing separate returns” will now be I.R.C. §1(e). See I.R.C.
§1(d) (2006).
188
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(d) (1) Married individuals filing under separate assessment. There is
hereby imposed on the taxable income of every married individual (as
defined in section 7703 [26 U.S.C.S. § 7703]) who does not make a single
return jointly with his or her spouse under section 6013 [26 U.S.C.S. §
6013], a tax determined in accordance with the following table.191
If the taxable income is:
Not over $16,700
Over $16,700 but not over
$67,900
Over $67,900 but not over
$137,050
Over $137,050 but not over
$208,850
Over $208,850 but not over
$372,950
Over $372,950

The tax is:
10% of taxable income
$1670, plus 15% of the excess over
$16,700
$9350, plus 25% of the excess over
$67,900
$26,637.50, plus 28% of the excess
over $137,050
$46,741.50, plus 33% of the excess
over $208,850
$100,894.50, plus 35% of the excess
over $372,950

For use of this filing designation, the married individuals must not earn the
same amount of income for the taxable year and one spouse’s earnings
must be at least $40,000 greater than the other spouse’s earnings.192
Married couples who choose to be separately assessed in the United States will be
individually taxed under the same tax rate schedule as if they filed jointly.
¶69
As practiced in the United Kingdom193 and Ireland,194 a couple can share the credits
or jointly decide which spouse will use each credit with the restrictions and designated
phase-outs for each tax credit applied to each spouse as if the spouse filed as single.
Specifically, couples can share the Hope and Lifetime Educational Credits, Child and
Dependent Care Credit, Adoption Credit, and Elderly and Disabled Credit, if applicable.
If a husband and wife cannot jointly decide how the credits should be allocated when
there is separate assessment filing, then, as is done in Ireland,195 the credit should be
apportioned by the cost incurred by each spouse related to the particular tax credit. If
spouses cannot determine what cost was paid by whom, then there should be a default
provision that the credit is shared equally. The default provision should include that a
spouse must fulfill the requirements for the credit.

191

Note that these are 2009 income tax rates for couples filing jointly.
The IRC provisions for married filing separately should be moved to from I.R.C. § 1(d) to I.R.C. §
1(d)(2).
193
Each spouse in the United Kingdom is entitled to his or her share of a number of allowances, including
the Personal Allowance, Married Couple’s Allowance, and the Blind Person’s Allowance. See HM
Revenue & Customs, Introduction to tax allowances and reliefs, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/introtax-allow.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). See also supra note 141.
194
See Irish Tax and Customs, Married Persons Taxation, http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/credits/marriedpersons-taxation.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
195
Id.
192
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However, unlike Ireland’s tax system,196 there will not be a set amount of income
taxed at the lowest income tax rate that can be transferred among spouses. Instead, under
separate assessment, each spouse is taxed progressively accordingly to the income levels
in each tax bracket. Furthermore, a married couple would not be able to file under
separate assessment unless both spouses work and one spouse earns at least $40,000 more
than the other spouse. This proposal is illustrated in the next section.
C. Illustrations of the Proposal

¶71
¶72

¶73

¶74

¶75

In this section the same explicative couples referenced in the previous sections are
employed. Remember, under each scenario, the couple will owe income taxes of $12,375
if they file jointly.197
Example One: Recall the couple where only the husband worked, earning $80,000.
The couple would not be able to file under separate assessment because both spouses do
not work. The purpose of the separate assessment designation is to assist secondary
earners. If the wife is not working, she and her husband should not be able to benefit
from separate assessment. However, it is important to note that if the wife decided to
work, the couple should think about filing under separate assessment instead of filing
jointly if the wife earns at least $40,000 less than her husband. This is because under
separate assessment, the wife’s income would be initially taxed at 10% and not at the
higher 25% marginal tax rate if they filed jointly.
Example Two: Now recall the couple in which both spouses work, earning $40,000
each. If they filed under separate assessment, each would owe income taxes of $5165,
totaling $10,330, which is $2045 less than filing jointly. As stated above, the separate
assessment designation is supposed to help lessen the tax burden on secondary earners.
There is no clear secondary earner in this family, because both spouses earn the same
income. Thus, this couple should not be able to take advantage of the IRC, by filing
under separate assessment instead of jointly, to lessen their income taxes when neither
spouse is facing a tax penalty.
Example Three: Finally, recall the couple in which the husband earns $60,000,
substantially more than his wife, who earns $20,000. Since the husband earns $40,000
more than his wife, they can file under separate assessment. Their individual income tax
liability would be $8165 for the husband and $2165 for the wife, totaling $10,330. This
is $2045 less than filing jointly. Instead of a 25% marginal income tax and 15% average
effective tax rate, under separate assessment, the wife’s marginal income tax rate, as a
secondary earner, is 15% and the average effective tax rate is 11%. This example
perfectly illustrates the importance of the separate assessment designation. The
secondary earner is not penalized with high marginal income taxes for working.
As these examples indicate, the proposal assists couples who both work, but where
one spouse earns at least $40,000 more than the other spouse. Under this proposal,
couples in such a predicament will owe less income tax by filing under separate
assessment instead of joint filing primarily because the secondary earner, likely the wife,
will not be exposed to the high marginal income taxes she would face under joint filing.
196
See Irish Tax and Customs, IT2–Taxation of Married Couples,
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it2.html#section14 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
197
See supra note 59. These examples exclude applicable deductions, exemptions, and credits to simplify
the focus on how the secondary earner bias arises.
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D. This Proposal can be Applied to the IRC
¶76

Potential critics of this proposal might argue that the proposal goes too far for
secondary earners. If couples are not required to pay the extra penalty for not filing
jointly, tax revenues may drop. The status of the current economy could support the
argument that the United States cannot afford to pay for the rate deduction. Additionally,
critics might argue that married couples should just file jointly instead of under separate
assessment because they would be receiving the benefits of filing jointly (i.e., the tax
credits). Some might even argue that having married couples think of themselves as
individuals could incite the deterioration of the family as a unit. Consequently, divorce
rates could increase.
¶77
What these potential arguments do not take into account is the fact that giving
people more and better choices as to how they want their income taxed is essential for the
betterment of families and the United States as a whole. Under this proposal, married
couples, particularly married women, will be able to decide whether the wife should work
or not and if she does work, which filing option is best for them without interference by
the government. Studies indicate that in countries that offer the choice of joint filing and
independent filing or separate assessment, “better-off, two-earner couples can opt for the
advantages of independent taxation (such as privacy and autonomy in financial affairs)
[separate assessment], and lower income one-earner couples can benefit from the
advantages of income pooling [joint filing].”198 Thus, couples, together, can choose
which option is financially best for their families.199
¶78
Furthermore, lowering taxes offers an unambiguous incentive to work in the
market, which in turn creates greater amounts of income to taxation. “Economic theory
suggests that reductions in marginal personal income tax rates would increase
participation in the labor force. The marginal rate cuts would, in turn, benefit the
economy by strengthening the incentives to work and save.”200 One of the primary
reasons behind the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which drastically decreased marginal
income tax rates, was the Reagan administration’s proposition that lowering taxes would
actually increase revenue. Upon signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, President Reagan
stated:
When I sign this bill into law, America will have the lowest marginal tax
rates and the most modern tax code among major industrialized nations,
one that encourages risk-taking, innovation, and that old American spirit
of enterprise. We'll be refueling the American growth economy with the
kind of incentives that helped create record new businesses and nearly
11.7 million jobs in just 46 months. Fair and simpler for most Americans,
this is a tax code designed to take us into a future of technological

198

O’Donoghue & Sutherland, supra note 93, at 6.
Id.
200
WILLIAM W. BEACH, ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., APPENDIX: THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL EFFECTS
OF THE PRESIDENT'S GROWTH PACKAGE 20 (2003), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/budget/cda0305a.cfm.
199
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invention and economic achievement, one that will keep America
competitive and growing into the 21st century.201
¶79

President Bush’s tax cuts on income, capital gains, and dividends in 2003 produced
a $785 billion increase in revenue over four years.202 In fact, by lowering taxes, the
percentage of taxes paid by the wealthy increased between 1980 and 2005.203
¶80
Moreover, although this proposal draws on international examples, the idea of
individual filing for married couples is not altogether foreign to the debate in the United
States.204 Specifically, Lawrence Zelenak proposed individual filing in 1994 under the
assertion that the IRC should abolish the requirement that married couples identify
themselves as married when filing their return.205 Instead, each spouse is treated as an
individual and taxed accordingly, and therefore, by taxing the spouses individually, the
secondary earner bias is eliminated and the spouse that actually earned and controlled the
income is taxed for it.206 Zelenak proclaimed that individual filing would alleviate the
secondary bias, because under a progressive tax system with joint filing for married
couples, the secondary earner is inevitably penalized.207 This proposal recognizes
Zelenak’s notion but clarifies which married couples can employ the separate assessment
designation and at what rates they will be taxed. As stated above, under the proposal,
only married couples in which both spouses work and one spouse earns at least $40,000
more than the other spouse can file separate assessment, where they are taxed at the
married filing jointly rates. Additionally, the proposal does not abolish joint filing or
married filing separately designations.
¶81
It must be noted that there would be no need for this proposal if secondary earners,
who in most instances are women, were not penalized for working by the IRC. It is
extremely important for families to be able to make their own decisions as to whether
both spouses will work. Couples making decisions together and thinking about what is
best for their families without interference by the government should strengthen families
not fragment them. Overall, this proposal does what Congress has not done: It recognizes

201

Remarks before Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 551 (Oct. 22, 1986), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagantaxreformactof1986.html.
202
Pete Du Pont, Inconvenient Tax Truths: Charlie Rangel and Other Liberal Leaders Want to Raise Tax
Rates Even if it Means Lower Tax Revenues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110010798. For President Bush’s tax cuts, see
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 38 (2001); Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 108th Cong., 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
203
Du Pont, supra note 202 (“According to the Treasury Department, the top 1% of income tax filers paid
just 19% of income taxes in 1980 (when the top tax rate was 70%), and 36% in 2003, the year the Bush tax
cuts took effect (when the top rate became 35%). The top 5% of income taxpayers went from 37% of taxes
paid to 56%, and the top 10% from 49% to 68% of taxes paid. And the amount of taxes paid by those
earning more than $1 million a year rose to $236 billion in 2005 from $132 billion in 2003, a 78%
increase.”).
204
See Alstott, supra note 47, at 2022–31; Bittker, supra note 11, at 1437–42; MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at
5, 65, 68–69.
205
Zelenak, supra note 24, at 342–44 (“The only way to avoid both marriage bonuses and penalties is to
abandon marital status as a tax determinant and to require that spouses file separate returns. . . . Mandatory
separate returns . . . can be persuasively defended as reflecting governmental neutrality between traditional
families and two-earner couples.”).
206
Id.
207
Id. at 339–40.
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the importance of secondary earners and the need to not penalize them with high
marginal income taxes.
V. CONCLUSION
¶82

Most people would agree that working women are necessary contributors to the
U.S. economy. Yet, the tax laws do not reflect these notions. The tax laws are outdated
and should be amended. Indeed, Congress has enacted some provisions that do favor
working women.208 However, this is not enough. By learning from the tax reforms in
Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, Congress could move forward in allowing
working married women in the United States to make choices about whether they want to
work or not without being penalized by the tax code if they do decide to work.
¶83
If the Malaysian and the United Kingdom experiences are any indication, then it is
most likely that the secondary earner bias will not be adequately addressed until
protestors, particularly voters, make it known to Congress that women should not be
explicitly or implicitly discriminated against by the tax code. What is very disturbing is
that it has taken so much time to bring to Congress’s attention the fact that many working
married women are unfairly treated by the tax code. In a country where every citizen is
supposed to be treated fairly and equally, it would seem that a discriminatory effect, such
as the secondary earner bias, would have not remained in force for such a long period of
time.
¶84
This proposal presents a considered method for lessening the discriminatory effects
of the IRC on working married women who earn less than their husbands. The creation
of the separate assessment designation allows most working married women to not be
taxed more than they would have been taxed if they had been joint filers. Such a
designation prevents these women from becoming victims of the secondary earner bias
and its associated higher marginal income tax rate. Additionally, under separate
assessment, working married women may still access the same applicable tax credits
available had they filed jointly with their husbands. Most importantly, with the separate
assessment filing designation, married women will be able to make their own choices:
whether they want to begin working or resume a career, and how they want their income
to be assessed without interference or influence by the government. They will be able to
make these decisions unburdened by the secondary bias presently lurking in the tax code.

208

For instance, the “head-of-household” filing designation may result in a better tax position for women if
the taxpaying woman is a single mother. However, the child care credit, head of household status, earned
income tax credit, and dependant care credit all generally improve women’s tax positions less than they
improve men’s. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax in TAXING AMERICA 25 (Karen B. Brown & Mary
Louise Fellows eds. 1996); Alstott, supra note 47, at 2038–39, 2056–60; Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the
Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 63–
91 (1971); Staudt, supra note 79, at 1571, 1601–05, 1609.
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